On June 24 and 25, NATO leaders will gather in The Hague for their annual summit. This meeting comes at a time of complex external security challenges for the alliance and apparent divergences in how to respond to and deter critical threats. The lack of consensus on central issues and the fear that US President Donald Trump could disrupt a normally scheduled meeting have led to the summit agenda and published declaration being extremely concise. The main objective of the summit will be to set a new target for defense spending by allies.
If the summit concludes without public disputes among allied leaders and countries adopt the new defense spending targets, the meeting in The Hague could offer an opportunity for the alliance to demonstrate a credible commitment to collective security in an era of shifting power balances and geopolitical uncertainty. However, Trump’s ambivalence towards NATO and its allies will cast a shadow over any positive outcome of the summit.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it has been relatively easy for NATO leaders to condemn Russia and support Ukraine, although Ukraine has not received a concrete invitation to join the alliance. NATO has also adopted an increasingly firm stance against the threat posed by China. Since the 2022 NATO summit, leaders of the four Indo-Pacific countries (IP-4) – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea – have participated each year, reflecting common interests and growing interconnection between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.
The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration underscored the need to deter Russian aggression, outlined programs to support Ukraine, including the NATO-Ukraine Council established at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, recognized growing military and technological cooperation between Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and designated China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Additionally, the declaration sought to strengthen ties between NATO and the IP-4. However, it is difficult to imagine the alliance reaching consensus on these issues today, given the increasingly divergent views between the United States and its NATO allies.
The development of a “strategic approach towards Russia,” agreed upon at last year’s summit, has been paused due to US efforts to negotiate with the Kremlin. Recent summit communications have reiterated the goal of contributing 2% of GDP, as agreed at the 2014 Wales meeting, in response to the first Ukrainian invasion by Russian President Vladimir Putin. A decade later, two-thirds of NATO countries have met this target. Trump has made it clear that 2% is insufficient and has proposed a new target of 5% of GDP in defense spending. Europeans seem to be converging on the idea that achieving 5% is viable in the next decade, if split between 3.5% in primary defense spending and 1.5% in infrastructure, although many will struggle to meet this target.
The current geopolitical landscape presents monumental threats from both the east and the west. On the eastern flank, Russia continues its brutal war of aggression in Ukraine and is escalating its hybrid activities in NATO territory, including arson, sabotage operations, and (attempts at) selective assassinations. Intelligence community leaders in key allied states have begun publicly warning about the destabilizing effects of Russian asymmetric activities and have expressed concerns about the possibility of a “direct military confrontation” with the alliance and a “large-scale war” in Europe by the end of this decade.
Simultaneously, Trump and members of his administration have repeatedly questioned the value of NATO and accused allies of freeloading. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump invited Russia to “do whatever it wants” to countries that do not meet the 2% GDP defense spending target. Upon returning to the presidency, he reiterated in an Oval Office meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that the United States would not come to the aid of allies who do not meet defense spending targets in the event of an attack. Public questioning and conditional security commitments inherently undermine the fundamental principles of the alliance’s collective defense and credible deterrence.
Despite Trump’s message, US officials continue to affirm the US commitment to defending NATO‘s European allies, as did the US Permanent Representative to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, at a security conference in Estonia in May. The nomination of US Air Force Lieutenant General Alexus G. Grynkewich as the new NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who oversees all NATO military operations, is also a signal that US extended nuclear deterrence remains in place.
At the same time, a new concept of a “sleeping NATO” has emerged in the US right, envisioning minimal US presence in Europe and a shift of US equipment and personnel towards the Indo-Pacific. Proponents of this idea consider China the greatest strategic threat to US national security and argue that Europeans should take primary responsibility for deterring Russia. Whitaker, among others, has indicated that a reevaluation of the US force posture in Europe and a reduction of troops is likely to occur after the summit.
Europeans have understood that they must take primary responsibility for their own security and defense in the future. This understanding will only strengthen NATO and should have happened a long time ago. As Europe develops and improves the necessary capabilities to do so, it will continue to depend on the United States, at least in the short term and very likely in the medium term, for leadership in the alliance and the provision of critical strategic enablers. More than anything, Europe hopes for an orderly transition process of the shift in burden, rather than a sudden and uncoordinated withdrawal by the United States.
As Europe rebuilds its defense industry, the extension of US access to investment opportunities and joint acquisition projects has emerged as a point of controversy. Beyond comments that undermine confidence in US extended deterrence in Europe, the Trump administration has threatened the sovereignty of two of its own allies, Canada and Denmark, both founding members of NATO. Along with coercive economic pressure in the form of tariffs, Trump’s insistence that Canada someday become the 51st state of the United States and his refusal to rule out the use of military force to gain control of Greenland (an autonomous territory under the Kingdom of Denmark) raise unprecedented questions for allies. Meanwhile, the administration continues to attack centrist European governments for actions taken against right-wing extremists. A recent post from the State Department on Substack stated: “Far from strengthening democratic principles, Europe has degenerated into a breeding ground for digital censorship, mass migration, restrictions on religious freedom, and numerous other attacks on democratic self-governance.”
Transatlanticists can hope that the upcoming summit in The Hague will stabilize the Euro-Atlantic community amidst the geopolitical storm. However, they must be prepared for the possibility that Trump will continue to question the utility of NATO for the United States throughout his presidency, raising concerns about the future of the alliance, as he did during his first term. Another risk is the emergence of a different type of transatlanticism; once used as a synonym for shared liberal values, transatlanticism now includes revisionists with coinciding agendas on both sides of the Atlantic who are forming increasingly close ties. This could destabilize the European project and multilateral institutions, including the European Union and NATO.
With a very short meeting planned, any lack of news from The Hague will be a good sign for NATO, although attention will focus on several key issues. Donald Trump will be the center of attention on June 24 and 25. He is expected to travel to The Hague for the summit, although he could decide to leave early, as he did at the recent G7 meeting in Canada. In the days leading up to the meetings, US officials will insist that the US commitment to protect and defend its NATO allies is solid. However, Trump could say something that undermines that sentiment among allies, as he has done several times, including at NATO summits during his first term. Danes and Canadians hope he will not bring up his territorial ambitions toward them while in Europe.
Leaders are expected to agree on the proposed defense investment plan, through which allies commit to increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP over the next decade. Rutte and leaders of several European NATO countries have proposed a two-tier plan in support of this effort, consisting of 3.5% in “hard military” spending and 1.5% in “defense-related projects,” including infrastructure and cybersecurity, which could help address emerging hybrid threats.
Ukraine has received tremendous support from the United States and NATO since Russia’s large-scale invasion. However, the recent G7 finance ministers and central bank governors’ summit statement softened its rhetoric on Russia’s war, condemning the country’s aggression but removing the language used by the G7 in 2024 about the “unjustified, unjustified, and unjustified total invasion of Ukraine” by the Kremlin. Ukraine and its supporters hope that this year’s NATO summit declaration will continue to condemn Russian aggression, although it is unlikely to offer full commitment to Ukraine’s defense, given the current US ambivalence towards supporting Ukraine. At the three previous NATO summits, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was invited to join the main discussions; this year he will have a much smaller role due to allies’ fears of alienating Trump.
NATO allies hope to get through the summit without any disagreements. Still, Trump’s threats of tariffs and the administration’s constant criticism of European efforts to maintain democracy in the face of extremist threats loom in the background. NATO will struggle to stay united during Trump’s second term; the June summit will be a good opportunity to learn how difficult this could be.
