The fall of el-Fasher in North Darfur to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on October 26 highlights the escalating humanitarian crisis in Sudan. This event challenges Washington’s efforts to create a consensus with Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi to end the conflict. By November 18, when President Donald Trump is set to host Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, thousands in el-Fasher who survived the RSF’s 500-day siege will likely have been massacred. The brutality, reportedly ethnically motivated, aligns with the RSF’s roots in the notorious Janjaweed militias accused of genocide in Darfur two decades ago. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) recent indictment of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”) for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2003 and 2004, the ICC’s first indictment from the Darfur conflict, has done little to moderate the RSF’s current quest for carnage.
In Port Sudan, authorities ordered the expulsion of two senior World Food Program (WFP) officials just two days after the RSF overran el-Fasher. This move reflects a pattern of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) deliberately obstructing life-saving humanitarian assistance. Since the SAF-RSF conflict began in April 2023, the SAF has denied access on claims of sovereignty, obstructed famine research, expelled aid workers, and refused visas for humanitarian personnel. The SAF’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), dubbed a “hidden wall,” creates bureaucratic hurdles to hinder aid delivery. In some areas, the HAC has attempted to control the Emergency Relief Rooms (ERRs), a grassroots network supplying essential services. In others, shadowy cells linked to SAF intelligence services and SAF-aligned Islamist militias have menaced, detained, and killed ERR activists, who are often the only source of food and medicine to their communities. The Norwegian human rights group recently recognized the ERRs’ heroism with its 2025 Rafto Prize, a rare bit of positive news about Sudan.
The RSF also weaponizes humanitarian access, as seen in the berm built during its siege of el-Fasher. The RSF has looted humanitarian supplies and murdered local aid workers. Immediately after the fall of el-Fasher, RSF fighters killed or abducted 460 health workers, patients, and others in el-Fasher’s last functioning hospital. Even after gaining control of the city, the RSF continues to block all humanitarian assistance to its remaining residents. Both the SAF and RSF demonstrate contempt for international humanitarian law and the welfare of Sudan’s citizens. The SAF launches airstrikes on civilian marketplaces and has been sanctioned for the use of chemical weapons, while the RSF massacres non-Arabs in Darfur. Both forces rely on external support, with fingers pointing at the United Arab Emirates for arming the RSF, and Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran backing the SAF.
Sudan faces the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis, with two declared famines (in el-Fasher and Kadugli in South Kordofan), 20 additional areas across Darfur and Kordofan at risk of famine, and millions more in crisis and emergency food insecurity. Despite the Geneva Conventions and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2417 (2018) outlawing the use of food as a weapon of war, the SAF periodically denies permission to deliver humanitarian assistance to Darfur via Chad, citing sovereignty. Concerned about the SAF ejecting U.N. personnel from Port Sudan, U.N. officials have complied with SAF denials, despite the SAF’s lack of physical control over the crossing points with Chad. In September, the SAF pushed back an RSF offensive on el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, bordering Darfur. Logistically, el-Obeid’s airport could be a sensible hub to deliver emergency supplies to el-Fasher, but facilitating this would be contrary to the SAF’s usual approach of denying aid to RSF-held areas. Residents of el-Fasher who survived the RSF siege and slaughter could now face a combination of RSF and SAF-facilitated starvation.
The Trump administration is attempting an “outside-in” approach to end Sudan’s agony. Washington created a “Quad” initiative to align Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE behind shared goals, including a humanitarian truce, that they could impose on the parties reliant on their support. However, the Trump administration’s reduction of U.S. foreign assistance may hasten as many Sudanese deaths as the RSF is currently inflicting on el-Fasher. Last year, the United States funded nearly half of all humanitarian assistance to Sudan. As of October, the U.N.’s $4.2 billion 2025 humanitarian appeal for Sudan was only 27% funded, with little coming from Washington. Sudan’s civilians, whether suffering under the RSF’s reign of terror, fighting for survival under SAF control, or fleeing to neighboring countries, have received insufficient attention and relief from the international community.
Perhaps the atrocities witnessed in el-Fasher will provide momentum to Washington’s Quad diplomacy and revive U.S. humanitarian funding. This could ignite a global campaign for Sudan, mirroring the high-profile, active coalition that came together two decades ago to stop the carnage in Darfur. RSF and SAF leadership, and their external supporters, need to feel consequences for enabling genocide and war crimes. If the fall of el-Fasher triggers a de facto partition of Sudan, with parallel authorities (one recognized by the U.N., both unconcerned with the welfare of Sudanese under each side’s respective control), the result could make a Libya-like scenario preferable. Despite Libya’s division and instability, the U.N.-brokered ceasefire of October 23, 2020, has largely held, with only sporadic violence and far fewer casualties than Sudan faces today. Sudanese live under catastrophically worse conditions.
Desafortunadamente, el general Abdel-Fattah Burhan, jefe del SAF y supuesto jefe del estado (casi ficticio), y Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (conocido como Hemedti), jefe del RSF, despreciaron los esfuerzos tripartitos de 2022-2023 de la ONU, la Unión Africana y la Autoridad Intergubernamental para el Desarrollo (el organismo subregional para el Corno de África) para restaurar la transición civil de Sudán, dirigiendo sus fuerzas el uno contra el otro en lugar de eso. Burhan y sus partidarios islamistas luego expulsaron a la misión política y de paz de la ONU. En su lugar, el enviado personal del secretario general de la ONU, Ramtane Lamamra, carece de personal, presupuesto y mandato para reemplazar la misión cerrada. Los estadounidenses tienen objetivos de cese al fuego bienintencionados que los sudaneses necesitan con desesperación para que triunfen. Pero una presencia equivalente en el terreno que la ONU utilizó con tanta efectividad para lograr el cese al fuego de 2020 en Libia no está disponible para Washington: el trasladarse entre Libia occidental y oriental que la ONU empleó sería bloqueado por Burhan en Sudán. Como se vio en el archivo humanitario, una presencia política en Puerto Sudán, bajo la presión del SAF y los islamistas, puede inhibir la objetividad y la acción. Tampoco parece que la administración Trump tenga la paciencia para sudar los detalles que los enviados de la ONU en Libia dominaron.
La iniciativa Quad de Washington
Dado el papel de los outsiders en permitir el RSF y el SAF, la iniciativa Quad de Washington tiene sentido. Sin embargo, para que los esfuerzos de cese al fuego de EE. UU. tengan éxito, Sudán debe cambiar a un lugar más alto en las agendas ya congestionadas de Washington con Abu Dhabi, El Cairo y Riad. Los socios de la iniciativa Quad de Washington necesitan comprender que la administración Trump y el presidente mismo esperan seriamente que ejerzan su influencia para poner fin a esta guerra. Con Burhan y Dagalo ya sancionados, un indicio de posibles sanciones secundarias sería una indicación inconfundible de seriedad. Será revelador si y dónde Sudán aparecerá en la agenda de la reunión del príncipe heredero saudita del 18 de noviembre en la Casa Blanca.
