The dreams of a fully united American and European front toward China have faded. While Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals share many common interests regarding China, cooperation is now more likely to be driven by necessity rather than goodwill. Moving forward, transatlantic leaders must manage competing interests by aligning approaches where possible while avoiding policy decoupling where necessary. This involves assessing the constraints that hinder cooperation on China strategy and identifying specific opportunities for policy convergence in economic and security domains.
### Constraints on Cooperation
The United States has traditionally viewed Europe as a source of power to address global challenges. Despite occasional disagreements, leaders in Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals have coordinated responses on China across various issues. However, as the unipolar moment wanes and the Trump administration considers retrenchment from overseas commitments, Europe is increasingly seen as a power drain rather than a force multiplier. Some American officials have urged European counterparts to focus on continental issues rather than the Indo-Pacific.
This shift coincides with Europe’s diminishing willingness to follow America’s lead on China. In some capitals, Washington is viewed as more unpredictable and coercive than Beijing, akin to a rogue superpower. In others, leaders are preoccupied with security concerns related to Russia. The United States and Europe have divergent interests regarding China, with security concerns in Asia being more critical for Washington than for Brussels. This difference complicates transatlantic security cooperation on Chinese actions in Asia.
Four key constraints will limit transatlantic cooperation on China:
1. **Issue-Specific Cooperation**: As the world becomes more fragmented and multipolar, cooperation will be more issue-specific. China will exploit transatlantic divergences, making careful coordination essential to prevent wedges from driving the United States and Europe apart.
2. **Lack of Internal Unity**: Neither the United States nor Europe has a unified approach to China. Leaders on both sides have expressed concern about Chinese behavior but lack a strategy with broad political support. The Trump administration’s approach is fragmented, embracing elements of spheres of influence, retrenchment, and prioritization strategies at different times. European approaches vary widely depending on the capital and leadership, making cooperation episodic.
3. **Divergent Priorities**: The United States and Europe prioritize different issues vis-à-vis China. Security considerations in Asia, particularly Taiwan, are foremost for the Trump administration. For Europe, China’s support for Russia is the top concern. Economic issues, such as China’s industrial policy, are critical for European policymakers. Washington’s coercive economic policies and insistence on Europe fending for itself against Russia impede cooperation, necessitating trades across different issue areas.
4. **Economic Tensions**: Even in the economic arena, cooperation is challenging due to transatlantic tensions over trade, tax, and technology policies. Despite shared economic interests, mutual suspicion hampers cooperation. Efforts are needed to minimize these disagreements over time.
These constraints suggest that cooperation between the United States and Europe will be issue-based, episodic, economically focused, and often guarded. Leaders in Washington and key European capitals must develop policies and methods of cooperation robust against political shifts.
### Economic Agenda
The U.S.-Europe economic agenda on China should focus on three priority areas:
1. **Industrial Overcapacity**: Coordinating responses to protect against China’s industrial overcapacity, which is eroding manufacturing on both sides of the Atlantic. Washington and Brussels should establish shared metrics for judging overcapacity across sectors and align their actions to avoid redirecting Chinese overcapacity from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
2. **Export Controls**: Synchronizing export controls, particularly in strategic areas like semiconductors, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Full decoupling should not be the objective, but rather targeted derisking and protective measures. The United States and Europe should develop a common set of policies to address China’s use of export controls.
3. **Supply Chain Security**: Enhancing supply chain security, particularly around rare earths. China’s dominance in rare earth mining and production poses a serious threat. The scale of the investment challenge requires combined cooperation with countries like Canada, Australia, and others. Establishing attractive offtake agreements will incentivize companies to invest in ways that reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.
This shared economic agenda should form the basis for coordination not only between the United States and the European Union but also with other leading democracies. The G7 will remain a vital forum for alignment among advanced industrial democracies, including Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Agreement with South Korea, Australia, and others who are not members of the G7 is also critical, so they should be included consistently as G7 observers to maximize the effectiveness of China-related policy coordination.
### Security Agenda
While cooperation on security issues will be more challenging than on economic ones, there are discrete areas where policy alignment is possible:
1. **NATO Role**: As China becomes more active in the Euro-Atlantic area, there may be potential for NATO to develop a coherent approach. For now, most China-related security cooperation is likely to occur outside the NATO framework.
El conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania es una preocupación de seguridad primaria para muchos en Europa. Coordinar formas de disuadir a Beijing de apoyar a Moscú, ya sea a través de acciones diplomáticas o amenazas económicas, podría seguir siendo una prioridad alta mientras dure la guerra. Esto depende de la voluntad del gobierno de Trump de oponerse a la guerra de Rusia y tomar acciones que impidan el apoyo de China.
Producción industrial de defensa
Una iniciativa de producción industrial de defensa importante podría centrarse en la coproducción de municiones y potencialmente ampliarse a incluir plataformas más grandes y complejas. Este esfuerzo podría aumentar dramáticamente la capacidad de producción y reducir el precio de los sistemas individuales.
Operaciones militares
La cooperación de defensa de EE. UU. con China probablemente se centrará en un puñado de estados europeos, incluyendo Francia, Alemania y el Reino Unido. Estos países deberían coordinar con Washington sobre las despliegues militares en el Indo-Pacífico, particularmente los despliegues navales en los océanos Índico y Pacífico, a pesar de la oposición de algunos en el gobierno de Trump. Deben hacer claro que estas misiones se llevan a cabo en su propio interés nacional.
Alineación estratégica
EE. UU. y la Comisión Europea deben mantener la alineación estratégica en la política de China. Se deben realizar reuniones de estrategia de China regulares, lideradas por funcionarios de alto nivel para garantizar discusiones impactantes.
Alineación de políticas
Alinear las políticas transatlánticas hacia China sigue siendo crítica en esta competencia sistémica a largo plazo. A pesar de las especificidades diferentes, los países de ambos lados del Atlántico comparten un objetivo general de demostrar que las democracias pueden entregar resultados en casa y bienes públicos en el extranjero. La cooperación entre EE. UU. y Europa probablemente será basada en problemas, episódica, enfocada en la economía y cada vez más cautelosa. Sin embargo, esto no significa que la alineación de políticas sea imposible, solo más difícil. EE. UU. y Europa probablemente cooperarán más profundamente en responder al comportamiento económico de China, dado el peligro que representa para las bases de fabricación de EE. UU. y Europa. La cooperación de seguridad también debería ser posible en ciertas áreas más limitadas. Las recomendaciones destacan lo que se puede hacer a pesar de estos desafíos.
