Overview and Key Lessons
Few policy areas have seen less durable progress over the last thirty years than migration. Repeated attempts to negotiate a grand bargain on immigration have failed, and the issue is widely considered a “third rail” of American politics. The issue has only festered, becoming a top concern for voters over the last three U.S. presidential election cycles. Today, we see how profound and far-reaching the consequences of current migration policy can be. Even amid multiple global conflicts and a trade war, the Trump administration’s defiance of court orders and deployment of National Guard troops as part of its mass deportation policy are so far providing the most significant test of the rule of law.
While the Trump administration has fulfilled its campaign promise to bring border encounters down to historic lows, accelerating a downward trend that began in the closing months of the Biden administration, it has done so by presenting a false choice to the American people. The administration has cast most immigrants as “criminals” or “terrorists,” despite clear evidence to the contrary. It has weaponized immigration enforcement to create a culture of fear, not only among non-citizens but even by targeting those who might come to immigrants’ defense.
With a few notable exceptions, the administration seems intent on cutting off most legal migration options, including for those who could fill labor gaps in the U.S. and those fleeing persecution, conflicts, or natural disasters. Far from learning lessons from the family separation policy, which provoked widespread outrage during President Trump’s first term, his administration seems intent on going further and faster this time around. If recent history is any indicator, the pendulum of public opinion is likely to swing back again. And when it does, there may be a narrow window of opportunity to tackle the underlying problems that have plagued the U.S. for decades.
Seizing that moment will require a better understanding of what does and does not work to devise policies that advance the full range of U.S. interests at stake—economic, moral, and strategic. This paper seeks to draw lessons from the Biden administration’s approach—both its progress and its pitfalls—to help shape a more balanced migration policy. Even though immigration reform has eluded Congress for decades, better policy is possible.
Americans broadly agree on many of the key tenets of a balanced and pragmatic immigration policy, from increasing enforcement resources at the border to providing a pathway to citizenship for migrants already in the U.S. and linking legal migration pathways with labor market needs. Countries like Canada and Australia have developed systems that more directly link immigration to labor market needs. Moreover, with a larger share of the American population aging out of the workforce, and immigrants playing an increasingly vital role in helping drive U.S. economic growth, the need for a balanced and predictable migration policy has only become more urgent.
What we see today is not success. Success is an orderly and efficient border where asylum claims are adjudicated quickly in accordance with U.S. and international law. It is a system that makes available lawful pathways that serve our various interests as a country while enforcing the rule of law and imposing consequences for those who cross the border irregularly.
Under this kind of system, the government has the tools to increase or decrease migration levels in response to labor market needs, global crises or shocks, and communities’ capacity and willingness to absorb and integrate newcomers. Achieving such a system has been a challenge for every recent administration. But the urgency to do so only grows.
This century will bring more global crises and rapid demographic and technological change, and adapting to these changes will require a modern and functional migration policy.
1. Understanding the Surge
Displacement in the Western Hemisphere
When the Biden administration took office, the Western Hemisphere was in the midst of the largest displacement of people in its history. With over 10 million people displaced, this would become the defining driver of migration to the southwestern border of the U.S.
While migration surges are not new, the scope and scale of recent flows were unprecedented. Past spikes—such as Mexican migration in the 1950s, the Cuban raft exodus in 1994, and the Central American child migrant crisis of 2014—pale in comparison to the sustained volume of arrivals beginning around 2017 and peaking in 2022 and 2023 when U.S. border encounters exceeded two million annually.
Drivers of the Surge
To understand this spike, we must look beyond the U.S. border. Much of the new flows were driven by the collapse of Venezuela. Over 7.7 million people—roughly a quarter of the country’s population—fled repression and economic ruin under the Maduro regime.
At the same time, Latin America faced the deepest COVID-19 recession of any region globally, costing an average of 7% of GDP, and pushing more than 20 million people into poverty. During this time, criminal networks also became more prevalent in the human smuggling business and their tactics more sophisticated—for instance, recognizing the strains on detention capacity, they began coaching migrants to turn themselves in and claim asylum.
As COVID-19 travel restrictions subsided, the U.S. experienced one of the fastest economic recoveries in the world, with job openings far outpacing available workers. By July 2022, there were two open jobs for every unemployed person, up from 0.7 in January 2021. Consistent with the trend over the last 25 years—which shows a strong correlation between job availability in the U.S. and border crossings—increased labor demand clearly drew migrants north.
Changing Demographics
TEXTO FORMATEADO PARA WORDPRESS: 1. Understanding the Surge
Displacement in the Western Hemisphere
When the Biden administration took office, the Western Hemisphere was in the midst of the largest displacement of people in its history. With over 10 million people displaced, this would become the defining driver of migration to the southwestern border of the U.S.
While migration surges are not new, the scope and scale of recent flows were unprecedented. Past spikes—such as Mexican migration in the 1950s, the Cuban raft exodus in 1994, and the Central American child migrant crisis of 2014—pale in comparison to the sustained volume of arrivals beginning around 2017 and peaking in 2022 and 2023 when U.S. border encounters exceeded two million annually.
Drivers of the Surge
To understand this spike, we must look beyond the U.S. border. Much of the new flows were driven by the collapse of Venezuela. Over 7.7 million people—roughly a quarter of the country’s population—fled repression and economic ruin under the Maduro regime.
At the same time, Latin America faced the deepest COVID-19 recession of any region globally, costing an average of 7% of GDP, and pushing more than 20 million people into poverty. During this time, criminal networks also became more prevalent in the human smuggling business and their tactics more sophisticated—for instance, recognizing the strains on detention capacity, they began coaching migrants to turn themselves in and claim asylum.
El resultado no solo fue un aumento de la migración sino también un cambio dramático en su composición. Históricamente, la mayoría de los migrantes encontrados en la frontera de los EE.UU. provenían de México y América Central. En el año fiscal 2014, solo el 7% de las detenciones en la frontera fueron de fuera de México y América Central; pero hasta 2023, ese porcentaje había subido a 51%, reflejando un aumento de migrantes provenientes de Sudamérica, el Caribe, África y Asia.
No hay ruta que ilustre mejor esta transformación que el Gap de Darién—un tramo de selva impasable entre Colombia y Panamá que hasta 2023 se había convertido en un corredor para más de medio millón de migrantes, la mayoría de ellos venezolanos. El aumento de los migrantes de lejos lugares hizo más compleja su devolución, ya que esto requería esfuerzos diplomáticos frescos, vuelos costosos y en algunos casos negociaciones con gobiernos recalcitrantes que a menudo no estaban dispuestos a tomar a sus ciudadanos de regreso.
Paisaje de la Política Fronteriza
El paisaje de la política fronteriza solo aumentó la presión. La Titulo 42, invocada durante la pandemia, permitió expulsiones rápidas a México sin procesamiento formal, lo que redujo la carga de detención pero también eliminó las penas por reincidencia. La reincidencia aumentó: las detenciones repetidas subieron del 7% en 2019 al 27% en 2021, con tasas que alcanzaron el 49% para los migrantes mexicanos y del norte de América Central en mayo de 2022. Después de años de disminuyendo las detenciones en la frontera, la migración mexicana aumentó bajo la Titulo 42. Aunque la litigación retrasó su terminación, la administración también fue lenta en prepararse para un regreso al uso de la Titulo 8—un proceso más riguroso que, aunque más lento, impone consecuencias reales y ha demostrado ser más efectivo en detener las reincidencias.
Percepción Pública y Cambios de Política
Los críticos de la administración Biden a menudo apuntan a sus cambios tempranos de política—el revocatorio del decreto de la prohibición musulmana, el detenimiento de la construcción de la pared y el anuncio de un moratorio de deportaciones—como atractores para la migración aumentada. Es cierto que el presidente Biden corrió por un cargo de cambio con respecto a su predecesor y prometió una aproximación más humana a la migración. Pero mientras esta retórica probablemente tuvo un impacto en las corrientes hacia los EE.UU., había factores estructurales más profundos en juego: el colapso económico, la inestabilidad regional y la demanda laboral pent-up en los EE.UU. En la sección siguiente, examinaremos la respuesta de la administración Biden—examinando su efectividad para mejorar la identificación de los componentes esenciales de una política práctica de migración.
2. El poder de la mezcla de políticas
Enfrentamiento y Caminos Legales para Cambiar el Cálculo de Riesgo de los Migrantes
Las narrativas predominantes sobre la política de inmigración de la administración Biden la describen como demasiado permisiva o critican sus medidas de enfrentamiento tardías como “demasiado tarde”. Estas narrativas faltan una clave insight; las acciones más efectivas de la administración provienen de la combinación de caminos legales con medidas de enfrentamiento para influir en el cálculo de riesgo de los migrantes. Desde 2021 en adelante, la administración introdujo una serie de cambios de política diseñados para tanto detener la migración irregular y ofrecer opciones legales viables. Mientras algunos críticos acusaron al gobierno de adoptar un “estándar de fronteras abiertas”, muchos de sus programas de parados eran explícitamente vinculados a medidas de enfrentamiento. Los migrantes que no utilizaron estas vías legales a menudo enfrentaban consecuencias más severas, incluyendo expulsiones rápidas o inelegibilidad para asilo. La evidencia empírica sugiere que expandir caminos legales puede ayudar a reducir la migración irregular. Por ejemplo, en un artículo de 2024, el economista Michael Clemens encuentra que un aumento del 10% en los cruces legales fronterizos conduce a una disminución del 3% en los cruces irregulares dentro de 10 meses. En otras palabras, expandir el acceso a caminos legales es un “deterrente parcial pero sustancial” que, cuando combinado con medidas de enfrentamiento más intensas, puede influir en el cálculo de riesgo de los migrantes, nudgiándolos hacia opciones legales en lugar de rutas más peligrosas y no autorizadas.
Este efecto de sustitución no es inmediato—toma tiempo, debe implementarse a escala y debe acompañar a medidas de enfrentamiento credibles. Esta dinámica fue evidente durante la administración Biden. Después de alcanzar su pico a finales de 2023, las detenciones en la frontera comenzaron a disminuir.
La enmienda de la Ley de Inmigración y Control de Fronteras de 2023 fue un intento de resolver algunos de los problemas de la administración Biden con respecto a la migración. La enmienda proporciona fondos adicionales para la construcción de la pared fronteriza y establece nuevas medidas de enfrentamiento, como la construcción de campos de detención y la expansión de la capacidad de detención de la Agencia de Inmigración y Control de Fronteras (ICE). La enmienda también establece nuevas medidas de protección para los migrantes, como la creación de un programa de protección temporal para los migrantes que se encuentran en situaciones de emergencia y la creación de un programa de protección para los migrantes que han sido víctimas de violencia o persecución.
La enmienda de la Ley de Inmigración y Control de Fronteras de 2023 es una medida importante para abordar los problemas de la administración Biden con respecto a la migración. Sin embargo, es importante tener en cuenta que la enmienda solo es una parte de la solución. La administración Biden debe continuar trabajando para encontrar soluciones duraderas para abordar la migración irregular y proteger a los migrantes que se encuentran en situaciones de emergencia.
El analogo comúnmente evocado para la política migratoria es pensar en la migración como agua y nuestra frontera como una presa diseñada para gestionar los flujos. La migración ebba y fluye con los eventos globales—downturns económicos, inestabilidad política, desastres naturales y demanda laboral. La migración es una fuerza que, cuando se maneja bien, puede ser aprovechada para apoyar el crecimiento, la resistencia y la renovación. Una presa bien diseñada no tiene por objeto detener el agua por completo. Gestiona el flujo—protegiendo a las comunidades de abajo mientras asegura que el agua va a donde se necesita más. Lo mismo ocurre en la frontera. El objetivo no es la migración cero. El objetivo es migración manejable, legal y beneficiosa que fluya a través de canales estructurados e intencionales. Pero incluso una presa bien construida tiene un límite—tiene capacidad de carga, el máximo flujo que el sistema puede procesar sin desbordarse. Es lo que tiene la frontera de los EE.UU.
Políticas de Enforcement y Caminos Legales
Es importante recordar que las primeras acciones del gobierno Biden para aumentar la vigilancia fronteriza ocurrieron en 2021, no en 2024. A partir de 2021, los oficiales avanzaron en reformas para ajustar la elegibilidad de asilo y acelerar el proceso de adjudicación para cerrar el agujero de la política de asilo que filtraba a tantas personas en un sistema muy retrasado. Una medida clave fue permitir que los agentes de asilo—no solo jueces de inmigración—juzgaran las reclamaciones, lo que ayudó a reducir el retraso y mitigar una perversa incentiva: los migrantes se entregaban a las autoridades para obtener fechas de audiencia años en el futuro. Cuando las crisis globales emergieron, el gobierno respondió con herramientas adaptadas. Cuando los nacionales ucranianos se acercaron a la frontera después de la invasión de Rusia en el primer trimestre de 2022—con hasta 1,000 ucranianos apareciendo cada día en Tijuana—el gobierno lanzó Uniting for Ukraine (U4U), un programa de patrocinio privado de parada. El gobierno desplegó un esfuerzo rápido y de todo el gobierno, con mensajes claros para desalentar la entrada irregular. Las llegadas legales desplazaron rápidamente las entradas irregulares y el componente privado del programa sirvió como un límite natural del tamaño del programa. Este modelo se escaló con CHNV. Lanzado en octubre de 2022 para venezolanos, y luego expandido en enero de 2023, permitió hasta 30,000 migrantes vetados mensuales de cuatro países entrar legalmente si aplicaban desde el extranjero (en lugar de presentarse en la frontera de los EE.UU.) y tenían patrocinadores en los EE.UU. A la vez, aquellos de los mismos países que intentaban entrar irregularmente fueron expulsados a México. El programa tuvo efectos inmediatos y eventualmente duraderos, reduciendo las entradas irregulares de estos países dramáticamente mientras proporcionaba a más de 530,000 migrantes la oportunidad de obtener un permiso de trabajo por 2 años y cubrir las brechas laborales. El número de caminos legales disponibles fue mucho menor que el número de migrantes que intentaban cruzar irregularmente. Aún cuando el número de entradas por parada se redujo—de 1,000 por día en junio a menos de 10 por día en octubre de 2024 después de que el programa se detuvo para abordar preocupaciones sobre la verificación de patrocinadores de CHNV—no desencadenó un cambio hacia la migración irregular. Esto resalta cómo la combinación de aumento de la vigilancia y un camino legal trabajó para cambiar el comportamiento. Y justo como importante, esta enfoque equilibrado abrió la puerta para una mayor cooperación en la vigilancia fronteriza entre los EE.UU. y sus vecinos. Específicamente, CHNV permitió al gobierno de los EE.UU. negociar con México para recibir hasta 1,000 regresos diarios de nacionales venezolanos, haitianos, nicaragüenses y cubanos que no se presentaron a estos nuevos caminos legales. Aunque la implementación fue difícil y México recibió una pequeña cantidad de venezolanos al principio, este acuerdo también animó a México a aumentar su propia vigilancia interna, tomando medidas para limitar el viaje para los migrantes más al sur que se dirigían a la frontera de los EE.UU.
CBP One y otras medidas
Meanwhile, CBP One, a mobile app launched in early 2023, allowed 1,500 migrants a day to schedule asylum appointments in advance. During the period that CBP One was in effect from January 2023 to January 2025, nearly 1 million migrants scheduled appointments at ports of entry. It allowed migrants to be pre-screened, giving law enforcement officials time to assess potential security threats and collect information about those entering the U.S. While the app was criticized by some human rights advocates, who alleged it unduly restricted asylum access, its effectiveness in controlling border arrivals is undeniable.
Further steps, such as the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule and the Securing the Border Rule, added teeth to these efforts by denying asylum eligibility to those who bypassed legal channels. The Securing the Border Rule, implemented in June 2024, suspended most asylum cases when encounters exceeded 2,500 a day, and could only be reinstated after the 14-day average dropped below 1,500 per day. The rule effectively increased the threshold for initial asylum screening from credible fear to requiring a proactive manifestation of fear.
The rule was controversial. Officials defended it as a legal way to get border numbers under control, enabling more efficient removal of those lacking valid claims while keeping asylum open to those who truly needed it. But human rights groups and other outside experts assailed the rule as a violation of U.S. and international law. Administration officials also debated this measure extensively, but after Congress did not pass the bipartisan border security bill, the administration enacted the rule, which had the intended effect of further reducing irregular flows to the border.
This kind of measure may prove to be vital in future crises, making the establishment of other protection pathways that can be accessed away from the border even more important.
3. You Cannot Do It Alone
Why Migration Response Must Be Regional
The administration worked with partner countries to expand repatriation flights and step up their own enforcement actions. By securing agreements with key regional partners like Colombia and Ecuador to increase the number of return flights, the administration was able to more quickly remove those without a legal basis to remain in the U.S., thereby reducing the strain on detention facilities.
Mexico’s cooperation in more aggressively going after smuggling and trafficking organizations and limiting the use of buses and trains for migrant smuggling proved crucial to bringing down irregular flows in 2024.
The administration also launched a pilot with the government of Panama in mid-2024 to repatriate migrants who entered Panama through the Darién Gap, rather than facilitating their transit northward toward the U.S. The number of migrants transiting through the Darién Gap plummeted as the combination of increased deterrence and lawful pathways started to work.
These steps all sought to change migrants’ risk calculus, incentivizing them to apply for lawful options rather than pursue dangerous irregular journeys to the U.S.
The administration’s policy steps were not without detractors, as rights groups called these steps draconian and overly restrictive of asylum access while Republican governors sued to block the lawful pathways programs. But it was precisely this multifaceted approach, combining lawful pathways with credible enforcement, that ultimately reduced irregular migration in a constrained and suboptimal policy context in which Congress chose not to support a bipartisan compromise that would have increased border patrol, detention, and repatriation resources.
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One of the clearest lessons from the Biden administration’s experience is that migration management cannot succeed through unilateral action alone. Regional dynamics—economic instability, shifting visa rules, and other countries’ policy posture toward migration—directly shape who arrives at the U.S. border and when. Any sustainable solution requires cooperation across borders.
When Colombia offered 10-year Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to 2.4 million Venezuelans, onward migration slowed. But when it cut off eligibility in January 2021, meaning those who arrived after this date would not be eligible, the U.S. immediately saw more migrants passing through Colombia and continuing north in search of opportunity. This trend played out repeatedly as other countries’ policies impacted flows to the U.S. border. The policy changes that Chile enacted toward Haitians in 2021, for instance, making it much harder for Haitians already living in Chile to obtain or renew residency permits, led to a wave of migration of Haitians from Chile to the United States, culminating in the Del Rio episode, where the gathering of thousands of Haitian migrants under a bridge led to a local state of emergency, an ugly confrontation with border patrol agents, and the mistreatment of many migrants. Similarly, after Mexico imposed a transit visa requirement for Venezuelan migrants, targeting those who had been flying into Mexico to travel north to the U.S., migrants found other ways to come up to the southwest border—specifically through the dense jungle in the Darién Gap—and numbers again reached another all-time high.
A more coordinated strategy across partner countries was clearly needed.
The benefits of regularization and integration: What actually keeps people in place One approach that worked at scale was the development of a patchwork of policies across the region providing migrants legal status and work authorization. Countries throughout Latin America—in particular Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil—received more than 80% of the Venezuelan exodus. Their integration policies enabled many migrants to access public services, enroll their kids in school, and seek formal-sector jobs. These and other neighboring nations granted legal status to over 4.5 million migrants, also helping reduce onward migration to the United States. These policies effectively absorbed millions of migrants in place—de facto taking them out of the pool of displaced people. UNHCR and Migración Colombia data support the relationship between these policies and reduced onward flows to the U.S., showing that relatively low numbers of those who transit through the Darién Gap have a residency permit in another country. These policies were not just acts of generosity—they were smart crisis management.
Countries like Colombia and Peru were dealing with a migrant crisis almost unprecedented in scale. By providing legal status, access to education and health services, and permission to work, regional governments gave displaced people reasons to stay and contribute. The immediate cost was significant: Colombia spent an estimated 0.5% of its GDP on integration efforts in 2019 alone. But over time, these investments are projected to pay off through higher tax revenue, labor market participation, and GDP growth.
Small checks, big returns: The U.S.’s role in integration success
U.S. foreign assistance—while comparatively modest—was instrumental in making these efforts viable. During the Biden administration, more than $500 million per year in humanitarian and development aid helped countries set up integration programs, establish one-stop migrant support centers, and support innovative initiatives like Brazil’s labor matching system (Operation Welcome) or Peru’s professional credential verification for Venezuelan doctors and nurses. During the first Trump administration, the U.S. Government had significantly increased humanitarian aid to respond to the Venezuelan migration crisis, reaching close to $1 billion from 2017 to 2020. The Biden administration maintained this commitment, providing humanitarian assistance to help the most vulnerable migrants meet their most basic needs, enabling them to get back on their feet while they figured out life in a new place.
The LA Declaration: A regional framework on paper and in practice
In 2022, the Biden administration formalized a new regional cooperation framework: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection (LA Declaration). Twenty-two countries agreed to shared goals and over two years, endorsing countries gave over 4.5 million migrants legal status, launched 300+ new transit visa policies, and worked together on law enforcement investigations of transnational migrant smuggling groups. Migration diplomacy under the Biden administration was a two-way street, with the U.S. encouraging countries to step up and do more and also coming to the table with foreign assistance resources and high-level political cover to help partner governments tackle their migration challenges. Migration cooperation became a top foreign policy priority for the United States.
Even as wars raged in Ukraine and the West Bank, Secretary of State Antony Blinken attended four Los Angeles Declaration Ministerial meetings in three different countries, demonstrating the U.S. Government’s commitment to high-level migration diplomacy.
A regional chain reaction
As countries stepped up, others followed. In one remarkable sign of the buy-in to this shared framework, countries like Argentina and Uruguay launched new regularization efforts in 2024—even as they anticipated potential outflows from Venezuela following what were expected to be unfree and unfair presidential elections in July. In total, eleven countries in the region have implemented generous policies to integrate Venezuelans and other migrants. What started as a crisis response started to look like a regional compact.
This multilateral approach enabled countries to coordinate on measures like transit visa policies that can become a form of whack-a-mole if countries undertake isolated actions. For instance, when Chinese nationals had started taking advantage of Ecuador’s visa-free policy, the government of Ecuador took important action, in coordination with the U.S. and other regional partners, to close this loophole. The number of Chinese nationals transiting the Darién Gap quickly plummeted by nearly 90%.
From burden to benefit: The opportunity of labor migration
By the end of Biden’s term, some countries were starting to treat migration not just as a problem, but as a resource. Efforts to expand labor pathways were central to this mentality shift. U.S. partnership with Northern Central American countries tripled the number of H-2 visas issued to the region between 2021 and 2024, surpassing 30,000. This new model relied on local government buy-in, rather than private recruiters, to help match labor migrants with U.S.-based employers.
Other countries with growing rates of outmigration, like Colombia and Ecuador, sought U.S. partnership to help their citizens access H-2 visas as well. These efforts were informed by research showing that these kinds of pathways serve as substitutes for irregular migration. It became increasingly clear that it was not just the U.S. or Canada that could benefit from well-managed labor migration. Countries like Mexico with aging populations or Guyana and Suriname with booming new industries all have labor needs that well-managed migration could help fill.
The lesson is clear: Strong partnerships, not just strong-arm, unilateral tactics, are the foundation of a sustainable, modern migration policy.
Regional integration policies—not just enforcement—are the invisible infrastructure that prevented millions from ever reaching the U.S. border.
4. The Refugee versus Migrant Conundrum
A System Built for a Different Era
One of the most persistent challenges the Biden administration confronted was the mismatch between modern migration realities and the outdated legal frameworks meant to manage them. The U.S. asylum system was designed in the aftermath of World War II to protect individuals fleeing political persecution. Today, that narrow definition often fails to capture the complex reasons people leave their countries—economic collapse, failed states, climate disasters, or generalized violence. Yet in the absence of alternative lawful pathways, more and more migrants turn to asylum as their only viable option for entry. This dynamic creates two critical problems. First, it overwhelms the system. Asylum officers and immigration courts are inundated with applications, many of which—while reflecting genuine hardship—do not meet the strict legal threshold for protection. Second, it distorts migrant behavior, incentivizing individuals with primarily economic motivations to claim asylum simply to gain a foothold in the United States. Countries in Latin America responded to these realities with a more flexible model. Colombia’s approach stands out: Rather than rely on individualized adjudications, it offered a broad-based, temporary protected status to 2.4 million Venezuelans. This streamlined approach avoided years-long backlogs and allowed displaced people to work, access services, and begin integrating almost immediately. Ten other countries in the region adopted similar strategies, bypassing the limits of formal asylum systems to manage large-scale displacement more pragmatically. The U.S., by contrast, remained tethered to a rigid legal architecture—though the Biden administration took steps to evolve it.
Key reforms included empowering asylum officers to adjudicate certain claims more quickly and creating the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule and Securing the Border final rule to redirect migrants to legal options before they reach the border. The administration also launched the Safe Mobility Initiative, which established triage centers in Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala where migrants could access information about various lawful pathway options, and if they chose, initiate their application process for refugee resettlement. Though small in scale—resettling around 30,000 people—the initiative represented a promising model: process migration upstream, expand lawful options, and reduce irregular flows. This innovation could undoubtedly be broadened in a future administration to enable migrants to apply for labor pathways to the U.S. and other countries, and pursue other lawful pathway options as well, with the goal of reviewing and adjudicating their cases elsewhere to reduce strain on limited border resources.
Lastly, the administration pioneered a private sponsorship model, leveraging the generosity and philanthropy of American volunteers to help settle displaced people more efficiently than through the refugee resettlement program. Through programs like U4U, CHNV, and Welcome Corps for refugees, Americans helped resettle more than 780,000 newcomers. These efforts did not replace the refugee resettlement program, which grew under the Biden administration to 100,000 refugees resettled in fiscal year 2024, compared to just 11,400 admissions in the last year of the Trump administration. But these private sponsorship initiatives enabled a large number of migrants to put down roots and integrate into communities in a way that would not have been possible through formal refugee resettlement.
5. When the Border Moves Inland
Cities on the Front Lines
The challenges of managing migration are not limited to the border. Cities across the United States are grappling with the influx of migrants, many of whom are released from federal custody into urban areas without adequate support systems. This has led to a rise in homelessness, crime, and public health concerns. To address these issues, cities are taking a variety of approaches. Some are investing in housing and social services, while others are partnering with non-profit organizations to provide support. Still, others are advocating for federal policy changes to better address the root causes of migration and provide more resources for local communities. These efforts are essential to ensure that cities can effectively manage migration and provide a welcoming environment for newcomers.
In conclusion, the Biden administration’s approach to migration has been marked by a recognition of the need for reform and a commitment to expanding lawful pathways for migration. While progress has been made, there is still much work to be done to create a more humane and functional system for the 21st century. Cities, too, have a critical role to play in managing migration and ensuring that newcomers are welcomed and supported.
While national leaders shape immigration policy, it is cities that absorb its most immediate consequences. During the Biden administration, a surge of arrivals—many entering legally through new pathways—placed immense pressure on urban systems unprepared for their rapid integration.
Historically, federal and state governments set immigration policy, while local governments were largely reactive: managing shelters, school enrollments, public health, and housing. But by 2023 and 2024, that equation had flipped. Cities like New York, Chicago, and Denver found themselves on the front lines, not just responding to federal policy but demanding changes to it.
Many of the new arrivals were legally admitted but lacked immediate access to work authorization. They also generally had fewer family networks than traditional undocumented immigrants, meaning that they were less likely to have support and help finding work. As a result, they became dependent on city-funded shelters and support systems at a time when many cities were facing housing and cost-of-living crises.
Municipal leaders, even those in immigrant-friendly jurisdictions, began calling for faster federal action—not only to authorize employment more quickly, but to provide emergency funding to cover growing costs. By the summer of 2023, there was a growing chorus from many mayors and governors urging the federal government to do more both in terms of resources and policy changes that would facilitate their integration.
The federal government’s response was inconsistent and slow. The lack of meaningful coordination and communication from federal authorities exacerbated the challenge for cities that were dealing with so many arrivals. And the failure to declare the crisis an emergency not only kept cities from unlocking further resources but deprived local leaders of political cover to more effectively manage the situation.
While over $1.6 billion was eventually made available through FEMA’s Shelter and Services Program, much of it arrived late, was restricted in use, and failed to keep pace with the scale of need. In the interim, cities were forced to shift funds from other essential services, leading to political backlash and a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment.
The administration eventually moved to expand Temporary Protected Status to nearly 500,000 Venezuelan migrants in 2023, increase eligibility for other nationalities, and expedite the issuance of work permits for those eligible.
These policy steps enabled migrants to get on their feet more quickly and get out of government shelters. But the damage in terms of public opinion may have already been done.
The lack of a coordinated response reinforced how cities bear uneven levels of responsibility when addressing a large inflow of migrants. Migrants flocked to places like New York and Chicago, but at the same time that these major cities were being overwhelmed, other cities had unmet labor needs.
Policies like community visas could entice migrants to go where the opportunities are. Under one such proposal, communities could apply to the federal government to become destinations for migrants that have certain skills to fill local labor gaps, thereby generating greater dispersion of migrants and more precise matching between demand for labor and migrants with the relevant skills.
While U.S. cities experienced this migrant surge differently from cities in Latin America, there could be value in looking at how other cities in the region dealt with large numbers of Venezuelan migrants.
In Brazil, the federal government was proactive in preempting the likelihood that migrants would flock to major cities, launching an interiorization initiative to match migrants who arrived in Brazil with job opportunities in cities and towns throughout the country.
In Colombia, the government gave cities a key integration tool with its national TPS policy. And the cities that were bold in attempting to quickly integrate migrants were those that benefited most economically and seemed to experience less blowback.
The Biden administration ultimately made some progress—for instance, announcing steps in September 2023 to speed up work authorization processing times and extending the length of automatic renewals—but systemic reform remains unfinished.
Necessary steps like shortening the six-month period that asylum seekers must wait to receive their work authorization would require an act of Congress. A future policy must account for the impact that changes to lawful pathways and enforcement measures can have at the city and state level from the very beginning and frontload resources and coordination capacity to minimize disruptions for local communities and speed up labor market insertion and integration processes.
The Bully Pulpit Matters
Effective communication and narrative are crucial in shaping public opinion and policy. The Biden administration’s inconsistent and slow response to the migrant surge exacerbated the challenge for cities and contributed to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment.
A future policy must prioritize clear and consistent communication, ensuring that local leaders have the resources and political cover needed to effectively manage the situation. This includes declaring the crisis an emergency, providing emergency funding, and expediting the issuance of work permits for eligible migrants.
Moreover, a future policy must account for the impact that changes to lawful pathways and enforcement measures can have at the city and state level from the very beginning. This includes frontloading resources and coordination capacity to minimize disruptions for local communities and speed up labor market insertion and integration processes.
Effective communication and narrative are essential in shaping public opinion and policy. The Biden administration’s inconsistent and slow response to the migrant surge exacerbated the challenge for cities and contributed to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment.
A future policy must prioritize clear and consistent communication, ensuring that local leaders have the resources and political cover needed to effectively manage the situation. This includes declaring the crisis an emergency, providing emergency funding, and expediting the issuance of work permits for eligible migrants.
Moreover, a future policy must account for the impact that changes to lawful pathways and enforcement measures can have at the city and state level from the very beginning. This includes frontloading resources and coordination capacity to minimize disruptions for local communities and speed up labor market insertion and integration processes.
Whatever one makes of the Biden administration’s record on immigration policy, there is little debate that it lost the messaging war—especially among moderate or persuadable observers. Even as irregular border encounters fell sharply in the final year of the administration and diplomatic wins mounted, public perception remained largely frozen. Poll after poll showed immigration approval ratings stuck near historic lows, unmoved by substantive progress. Here as well, there are lessons. First, perceptions are often cemented early. The Biden administration’s experience likely speaks to the importance of establishing a balanced policy from day one, recognizing that public perception may be hard to shift later. Despite ultimately advancing a balanced and multifaceted policy, the administration’s early tone—emphasizing compassion and undoing Trump era restrictions—set the frame. In a U.S. media environment laser focused on enforcement and border visuals, this frame stuck. Even a pivot to tougher rules could not dislodge the “soft on immigration” label. Explaining the interplay between lawful pathways, enforcement, and regional coordination earlier and more forcefully, and continuing to explain in the clearest possible terms what the administration was doing, was a gamble worth trying. Instead, the administration largely played defense, allowing media outlets and opposing politicians to define the narrative.
Lessons Learned
Second, the problem is bigger than optics. Immigration has become a proxy for a deeper public distrust in government competence. Americans do not just fear porous borders—they doubt any administration can manage migration effectively. That’s the political baseline any future administration must confront. And yet, other countries show that the politics do not always play out this way. In Colombia, former President Ivan Duque’s bold response to the Venezuelan migrant crisis became a defining achievement, and one that President Petro continued and expanded. In Brazil, Operation Welcome enjoyed bipartisan continuity—from Bolsonaro to Lula, with minimal fanfare and without significant political cost—a rare area of commonality between two leaders with sharply divergent governing agendas. A recent Inter-American Development Bank study found that only 10% of migration-related media in Latin America is alarmist compared to the dominant crisis narrative in U.S. coverage. Canada, long a champion of skills-based immigration, has maintained broad public support—at least until very recently—by aligning migration policy with labor market needs and national values.
Recommendations
The prevailing narratives about the Biden administration’s migration policies tend to fall into two camps: that any progress made was too little, too late—or that the administration failed because it was too permissive. Both overlook the complexity of what actually transpired—and the real-time innovation required to manage the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere’s history. A sober look at the Biden administration’s approach on migration reveals important lessons. The administration stood up lawful pathways at scale, forged unprecedented regional cooperation, and developed a new generation of policy tools. But it faltered in responding quickly to the needs of frontline cities. Its largely defensive messaging allowed others to define the narrative. And it struggled to deliver a compelling public case for the benefits of its approach. Still, the lessons are clear: Better tools. More flexible lawful pathways. Faster funding for cities. Clearer messaging. These are the building blocks not just for crisis response, but for a functional, forward-looking immigration system that reflects American values and interests.
Policy Recommendations for Future Administrations and Congress
**Build a Demand-Driven, Flexible Legal Labor Migration System**
The choice between legal migration and a secure border is a false one, and a future administration must make this case aggressively if it wants to create a political constituency for a moderate, pragmatic approach to migration.
Congress should replace outdated visa caps with a modern, demand-driven system that better matches U.S. labor needs. Current limits—such as the 65,000 H1-B cap (set in 1990 and modestly raised in 2005) and the 66,000 H-2B cap—are disconnected from today’s economic realities. The solution is likely not to impose a new arbitrary cap, but for Congress to create a more flexible system for both high-skilled and lesser-skilled that would accommodate permanent and temporary roles, including non-seasonal, long-term employment and allow regional or place-based visas that align migrants’ skills with local labor needs. There have been signs of bipartisan support in Congress for revisiting these caps or at least modifying how they are applied to create more flexibility for employers. For instance, in the current appropriations cycle, House Appropriations members unanimously approved a proposal to not count return workers under the H-2B program toward the annual cap, enabling employers to rehire the workers they need. Another bipartisan proposal would enable STEM graduates with advanced degrees from U.S. universities to seek employment and receive legal permanent residence in the U.S., without it counting against high-skilled visa caps. These processes should be demand-driven and less bureaucratic, while retaining protections for U.S. workers to ensure ethical recruitment and equal pay. An independent commission could assess labor market trends and recommend visa adjustments annually. Rather than imposing arbitrary limits that hinder employment and growth, these caps should function as an economic accordion, expanding in times of workforce shortages but also decreasing when jobs are more scarce.
Put Diplomacy at the Center of Migration Policy
On challenge after challenge, the Biden administration found that the role of regional and global partners was essential for finding durable solutions. Regional burden-sharing, coordinated transit policies, and harmonized integration efforts proved critical. While the Trump administration has so far compelled short-term cooperation from key partners, long-term success is likely to require deep, sustained diplomatic engagement. Multilateralism in migration is not idealism—it is a necessity.
Use Foreign Aid as a Strategic Multiplier
During the Biden administration, U.S. foreign assistance helped an unprecedented number of migrants settle within Latin America. Aid does not just stabilize populations—it builds policy momentum. The first Trump administration had understood this as it also provided increased assistance to address the Venezuela migrant crisis. Yet the current retreat from USAID and global assistance undermines U.S. leverage and trust. This approach has taken away one of the key tools the U.S. has to support partner countries in making life better for the millions of people displaced in the region and reducing the likelihood they will be displaced again. No future administration will be able to undo the harm these actions have inflicted on America’s global standing or trust among our partners. But a future administration should try to leverage foreign aid, even in a leaner form, to advance a balanced migration policy that serves U.S. interests and reflects U.S. values.
Supercharge Labor Matching Efforts
The misuse of the asylum process, as a way to enter the labor force, is not a U.S. phenomenon, but a global one. Both rich and developing country economies have significant unmet labor market needs, yet the systems to channel migrants with the right skills into the appropriate roles are either nonexistent or outdated and do not tap into already-displaced populations in search of opportunity. There is a huge opportunity for the current administration or a future one to help build an infrastructure across the Western Hemisphere and beyond to help countries match talent with labor needs. Creating such a system would not need to be resource-intensive, rather, it would just require a concerted diplomatic push and harmonization of skills taxonomy and visa regimes. Helping other countries build out their own lawful pathways could ultimately reduce irregular flows to the U.S. while improving life for millions of displaced people and helping partner countries meet their labor market needs and grow their economies.
Improve Federal Coordination with Cities
The administration’s slow response meant cities were left dealing with the consequences of a huge influx of immigrants, unable to integrate them quickly and move them from being a strain on public resources to contributors to the local economy. Any future expansion of lawful pathways must be paired with rapid-response funding and work authorization reforms. But even absent a future crisis, the Biden administration saw firsthand how, in the future, the federal government must be better coordinated with cities and be able to provide more flexible funding based on needs. Moreover, future administrations should be more proactive in working with cities to incentivize migrants to go where communities and labor markets can best integrate them. One positive result of the last few years is that cities have created valuable technical networks to coordinate responses and share best practices—these should continue and be strengthened going forward.
Create Paths to Legal Status for Long-Term Migrants Already in the U.S.
Officials need to bust the myth that creating paths to legal status is unpopular or has a pull effect. Most Americans support it. The Biden administration’s “Keeping Families Together” executive order, which would provide legal status to over 500,000 undocumented spouses, sparked virtually no backlash. Research confirms legalization does not create a “pull factor.” It is time to unburden cities and dedicate law enforcement resources to real threats, not separating long-settled families.
Go on Offense with Communications
Durante la administración de Biden, la cuestión de la inmigración se convirtió en una cuestión defensiva, lo que provocó un creciente renuencia a hablar sobre una agenda de política positiva. En algunos círculos, la frase no escrita era que un día sin hablar sobre inmigración era un buen día. Pero esta renuencia permitió a los críticos llenar el vacío. Los líderes futuros deben pasar de una postura defensiva a un caso fuerte por un enfoque equilibrado. Explique la política. Defienda la lógica. Confíe en el público. La oposición siempre arma con el miedo. La única antídoto es la claridad y la valentía.
La administración de Trump hasta ahora ha tenido acciones, pero puede surgir una ventana de oportunidad en cualquier momento para impulsar reformas comunes para abordar las debilidades fundamentales del sistema de inmigración. Mientras que los costos económicos y políticos de un enfoque solo de enfoque aumentan, Trump podría cambiar las dinámicas políticas sobre esta cuestión con solo un mensaje en Truth Social. Si esto ocurre, los líderes con enfoque en soluciones deberían aprovechar la oportunidad y encontrar terreno común, incluso si el progreso viene en pedazos. El país ha experimentado primero mano las consecuencias de un enfoque todo o nada, zero-sum sobre la reforma de la inmigración; es hora de intentar algo diferente, y esperamos que las lecciones y recomendaciones en este informe puedan ayudar a impulsar el progreso atrasado.
