
The 7th AU-EU heads of state summit, scheduled for 24-25 November in Luanda, Angola, will mark 25 years of formal Europe-Africa relations since the first summit in Cairo in 2000. Despite the euphoric declarations, skepticism and cynicism will likely persist post-summit. To break this cycle, both parties must utilize the time between summits more effectively, resolve major disagreements, and adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
The ritual of AU-EU summits typically involves EU civil servants drafting an ambitious joint vision or summit declaration. This document is filled with flowery language emphasizing equality, shared values, and common interests, often concealing long-standing tensions. The summits are preceded by poorly prepared side events involving think tanks, civil society, youth, and business organizations, aimed at creating an illusion of broad-based consultations. The EU promises substantial but vague financial packages, expecting African loyalty in return. This choreography, repeated approximately every three years, is no longer effective.
The EU can no longer claim to be Africa’s unique partner. The AU and its member states have diversified their foreign relations, with several countries from the BRICS group expanding their influence in Africa. The G20 Summit in Johannesburg, scheduled for 22-23 November, generates more excitement in the AU and Africa than the AU-EU summit. The EU’s Global Gateway, positioned as a pragmatic and values-based alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, may not be sufficient to restore trust, as it does not address the deeply rooted political tensions between the two continents.
Building a stronger partnership
To build a stronger political and mutually beneficial partnership, each party should clearly articulate its interests. The EU should stop portraying itself as a do-gooder with a mission to help Africa. Africans are aware that the EU, like any other global player, prioritizes its own interests, such as COVID-19 response, migration crises, and Russia’s war on Europe’s eastern borders. Patronizing attitudes and interference have created aversion and even hostility towards the EU, particularly France. The partnership remains largely Brussels-driven, with the EU setting the agenda and communication. African countries and AU institutions could develop their own strategy towards the EU, becoming co-architects of a jointly owned AU-EU strategy.
Real progress must occur between summits, not just during the two-day summit. This requires a structured and well-prepared process that openly addresses deeply rooted sources of friction, such as migration, raw materials extraction, climate adaptation, energy transition, agricultural commodities, and double standards on governance and values. Monitoring and follow-up mechanisms should ensure continuity, institutional learning, and tangible results. Ministerial meetings could play a constructive role if they are well-prepared and involve civil society, youth, businesses, social partners, and think tanks.
A new geopolitical context
A strengthened partnership between the EU and the AU should be fully integrated into the rapidly changing geopolitical context. The existing multilateral rules-based global order is perceived as unfair and no longer representative of the shifting economic and political power. The EU is seeking new allies in the Global South who disapprove of the ‘mafia-style politics’ of the US and Russia. However, the EU has been losing credibility in parts of the Arab world, Africa, and other parts of the Global South, especially due to its failure to condemn Israel’s war crimes in Gaza. Europe’s passive attitude towards Israel will continue to haunt Europe in the coming years.
If Europe wants to be taken seriously, it should support Africa’s demand for fairer representation in multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank, and be willing to adjust its own post-war overrepresentation. Without such changes, Africa and the wider Global South will continue to develop alternative institutions or gravitate towards non-Western power blocs such as the BRICS. The way forward for the AU-EU partnership is unpredictable in the current global context. There is no need for over-optimistic statements that fail to reflect reality. The next summit in Luanda should be the starting point of a more honest and open political dialogue, capable of producing compromises and mutual concessions on historical imbalances and substantial divergences of views that have clouded the relationship well before the formal 25 years of AU-EU summitry.
